Dupont Plaza Hotel arson
31/12/1986 San Juan, Puerto Rico
Type of Fire
Hydrocarbon, flashover
Ignition Source
Arson
Duration
5 hours
Casualties
98 fatalities, 140 injuries
Cost
Cost of life, $8m in damage, hotel sued for $100m in damages
What happened at the Dupont Plaza Hotel on New Year’s Eve 1986?
On 31 Dec 1986 a fire broke out in the Dupont Plaza Hotel. The fire spread quickly through the lower levels of the hotel, igniting all combustible materials within the two-level foyer until reaching the ballroom, where flashover occurred.
The hotel consisted of 20 storeys, a casino, ballroom, shops and a restaurant complex. The building was constructed during 1963 at a time where fire safety understanding and legislation was very different from today.
The building did not have automatic detection, was not equipped with an automatic water sprinkler system, and even the manual alarm system was reported to not be working at the time of the incident.
How did the Dupont Plaza Hotel fire start?
Three hotel employees were convicted of arson. The fire had been set deliberately using a single can of ‘SternoType fuel’ (cans of denatured and jellied alcohol fuel used for the purposes of warming food).
The material was placed on stacked cardboard through an opening of the partition dividing the north and south ballrooms and was lit to produce an open flame.
Among the combustible fuels were plastics, wood and cardboard packaging used to protect the furniture. At around 3:22pm flames were noticed to be extending the ceiling along with smoke and hot gases accumulating at the ceiling level radiating heat downwards due to the surface finishes on walls, floors and ceilings. This resulted in a rapid spread of fire along with a number of openings, such as doors and windows providing significant air supply.
What can the industry learn from the Dupont Plaza Hotel arson incident?
NFPA analysis of the fire identified four contributing factors to loss of life:
- No automatic water sprinkler system or detection system
- Rapid fire growth, due to surface linings
- Inadequate number of exits
- Vertical openings between ballroom and casino levels